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COMMENTARY
Getting There: A Brief History of the
Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments
by CALVIN R. MASSEY*
The history of Supreme Court nominations is replete with contro-
versy, acrimony, and partisan politics. Approximately one of every five
nominees has failed. Twelve of the 29 failed nominations were rejected
outright by the Senate. The remaining nominees either withdrew or their
nominations were postponed by Senate parliamentary maneuvers until a
new President assumed office. I will review this history by dividing it
into the following four relevant categories: (1) failed nominations; (2)
controversial but successful nominations; (3) instances in which-the Pres-
ident nominated the Senate's choice; and (4) instances in which the Presi-
dent has let the Court (or an individual Justice) dictate the choice. The
historical account which follows is not exhaustive;1 rather, it is a some-
what impressionistic account designed to place the current battles over
nominations to the Court in perspective.
Vendors of history are often asked to justify their wares in terms of
their contemporary significance or utility. I have anticipated that de-
mand by providing, in my conclusion, some thoughts about the lessons
that may be drawn from this history and by proposing that nominations
to the Court be confirmed only upon the approval of two-thirds of the
Senators present and voting.
* Professor of Constitutional Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law.
1. For a thorough account, see HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1985). For an-
other useful summary, containing a valuable tabular record of nominations to the Court and
their disposition, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).
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I. Failed Nominations
Nominees have failed for a variety of reasons, but the following have
been the most common: opposition to the President, not necessarily the
nominee; opposition to the nominee's political views; and doubts about
the ability or integrity of the nominee.
A. Opposition to the President
Candidates for the Court are rejected based on general opposition to
the President when the President is politically vulnerable for reasons un-
related to the nomination process. A few examples will illustrate this
point.
The election of 1824 produced no clear victor. Although Andrew
Jackson received the most electoral votes, he failed to obtain a majority.
As a consequence, the election was determined by a vote of the House of
Representatives, which selected John Quincy Adams to be President by a
very slim margin. The election was the product of a bargain struck be-
tween Adams and Kentucky's Whig Senator Henry Clay. Clay delivered
the critical votes to elect Adams as President, and Adams made Clay his
Secretary of State. As a result, Adams was politically wounded from the
beginning of his Presidency. Thus, although Adams nominated Ken-
tucky's former Whig Senator John Crittenden to the Court in December
1828, it was predictable that loyal Democrats in the Senate would want to
reserve the appointment for the incoming Andrew Jackson, elected the
month before. The Senate did nothing until February 1829, when by a
strictly partisan vote of 23 to 17 it postponed consideration of Crit-
tenden's nomination. A month later Andrew Jackson assumed the Presi-
dency and Crittenden's candidacy was ended. In all of this Crittenden
was almost irrelevant; the contestants were Jacksonian Democrats and a
lame duck President.
In 1840 the Whigs achieved presidential success with the election of
the fusion ticket of Whig stalwart General William Henry Harrison as
President and the former Democratic Senator from Virginia, John Tyler,
who had broken with Andrew Jackson and the Democrats over the nulli-
fication crisis and the Force Bill, as Vice President. Barely a month into
his term, Harrison died and Tyler assumed the Presidency. Tyler lacked
a personal political base and was suspected by congressional Whigs, led
by Senator Henry Clay, of being more of a Democrat than a true Whig.
These suspicions were quickly fueled when Tyler twice vetoed a favorite
[Vol. 19:1
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Whig project, revival of the Bank of the United States.2
When two vacancies on the Court developed, and Tyler was con-
fronted with a Whig majority in the Senate, the result was predictable.
Tyler's first nominee, John Spencer, was a veteran Whig who had held
two cabinet posts under Tyler, but who had incurred the implacable en-
mity of Henry Clay. Thus, "it was with more ease than the rejection vote
of 21:26 indicates that the Clay faction succeeded in blocking Spencer."3
Tyler then sent up Reuben Walworth, a sitting New York judge who was
opposed by both the Senate Whigs and the two Democratic Senators
from New York.4 The Senate voted to postpone Walworth's nomination
and the also pending nomination of Judge Edward King, "a distin-
guished Philadelphia lawyer and legal scholar."5
It was mid-summer and the Whigs scented electoral victory in No-
vember. It would be far better for these seats to be filled by the grand old
man of Whiggery, a newly inaugurated President Henry Clay, than by
the pseudo-Whig John Tyler. Tyler would not quit easily, however. The
Whig strategy had backfired in November, for Democrat James Polk had
defeated Clay and the vacant Court seats were sure to be filled by a Dem-
ocratic President. Reasoning that he ought to be the President filling the
vacancies, Tyler renominated King in December but the Senate simply
ignored the nomination.
Tyler tried twice more, sending up the distinguished and eminent
Samuel Nelson, Chief Justice of the highest court of appeal in New York,
and John Meredith Read, a former United States Attorney from Phila-
delphia with supporters in both the Whig and Democratic camps. The
Senate quickly confirmed Nelson, probably on the basis of his profes-
sional stature, but adjourned without ever acting on Read's nomination.
Tyler thus acquired the dubious record of making six nominations with
only one success. His failures are attributable to his low political for-
tunes - as an apparent Democrat and accidental successor to a Whig
President confronting a powerful Whig adversary in the form of Henry
Clay - rather than to evident deficiencies in his nominees.
Lame duck Presidents, for obvious reasons, have fared poorly with
Court nominations. In 1852 and early 1853, a Democratic Senate re-
fused to consider Whig Millard Fillmore's nomination of Senator George
Badger and two others in order to preserve the seats for the incoming
2. ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY, 1833-1845, at 475-76 (1984).
3. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 105.
4. Id. at 28, 105.
5. Id. at 105.
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Democratic President, Franklin Pierce. Badger's case was particularly
touchy, for it required the Senate to spurn one of its own members,
which the Senate did by a one vote margin.6 After Lincoln's election, in
December 1860 James Buchanan nominated his Attorney General, Jer-
emiah Black, and watched the Senate reject him by a single vote7 because
Republican Senators wanted to keep the seat for Lincoln.
Andrew Johnson found himself in a political situation akin to that
of John Tyler - an accidental successor to a President from a different
party - but with both passions and political stakes greatly enlarged by
the end of the Civil War. Unless Johnson had administered the Presi-
dency as dictated by the Radical Republicans in the Congress it is hard
to imagine how he could have had success with any nomination to the
Court. Johnson nominated his able Attorney General, Henry Stanbery,
but Radical Republicans in the Senate not only blocked the nomination
but abolished the seat and, for good measure, provided that the next va-
cancy would be abolished as well. "[I]t is doubtful that the Senate would
have approved God himself had he been nominated by Andrew
Johnson."8
When Grover Cleveland reassumed the Presidency after Benjamin
Harrison's interregnum, he attempted to fill the vacancy created by the
death of New York's Samuel Blatchford with another New Yorker, Wl-
liam Homblower, a 42 year old corporate lawyer. Cleveland failed to
anticipate the reaction of New York's powerful Democratic Senator
David Hill. Senator Hill insisted upon control of patronage within New
York and Cleveland refused to accommodate Hill. As a consequence,
and as both a measure of retribution for Cleveland's control of New York
patronage and as a device to demonstrate his own determination to con-
trol New York appointments, Hill persuaded his fellow Senators to reject
the appointment of Hornblower by a vote of 30 to 24. Undaunted,
Cleveland then nominated Wheeler Peckham, another New Yorker who
had personally alienated Senator Hill. Hill again asked his colleagues for
a repudiation of Cleveland's nominee, and they again complied, rejecting
Peckham by nine votes, 41 to 32. Frustrated, Cleveland filled the seat
with the Senate Majority Leader, Democratic Senator Edward White of
Louisiana.
Senator Hill ultimately prevailed in Cleveland's battle over nomina-
tions. When the next vacancy was created, Cleveland decided to appoint
Rufus Peckham, Wheeler Peckham's younger brother. Before doing so,
6. Id. at 111.
7. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 144-45.
8. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 123-24.
[Vol. 19:1
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Cleveland prudently wrote a conciliatory letter to Hill, requesting him to
concur, in advance, in the choice. Hill acquiesced and Cleveland was
able to place his second choice of the Peckham family on the Court.9
B. Opposition to the Nominee's Political Views
George Washington's 1791 nomination of John Rutledge, an influ-
ential member of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, for an initial seat
on the Court was swiftly approved by the Senate. Rutledge never served
however, preferring instead an appointment as Chief Justice of the then
more important Supreme Court of South Carolina. When John Jay re-
signed as Chief Justice to become Governor of New York, Washington
turned again to Rutledge. Since this second appointment was a recess
appointment, Rutledge presided over the Court as Chief Justice during
the August 1795 Term. Despite his interim service as Chief Justice, the
Senate rejected Rutledge by a vote of 14 to 10 when it resumed session
and considered the nomination.
Rutledge was rejected because he opposed Jay's Treaty, which was
negotiated the prior year as a means of eliminating points of friction re-
maining between Great Britain and the United States in the wake of
American independence. Federalists, who controlled the Senate, were
ardent supporters of Jay's Treaty. Rutledge's position was anathema;
thus, he failed the political litmus test of his time. His distinguished ser-
vice to his country and his unquestioned legal abilities did not matter to
his senatorial judges.
James Madison's nomination of Alexander Wolcott was rejected by
the overwhelming margin of 24 to 9 because Wolcott had vigorously en-
forced the Embargo and Nonintercourse Acts in his role as the federal
customs collector for Connecticut.
In 1845, James Polk nominated a staunchly Democratic Penn-
sylvania trial judge, George Woodward, who had alienated Penn-
sylvania's Democratic Senator Simon Cameron by virtue of his "gross
. . . sentiments" in opposition to immigration, particularly from Ire-
land. 10 Five other Democrats joined Cameron and combined with the
Whig opposition to reject Woodward, 29 to 20.
Ulysses Grant nominated his exemplary Attorney General, Ebene-
zer Rockwood Hoar, who was rejected 33 to 24 because he sought to
eliminate political patronage and, even worse, had opposed Andrew
Johnson's impeachment. Grant also nominated his good friend Caleb
9. Id at 144-45.
10. Id. at 41-42.
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Cushing to be the Chief Justice, but Cushing had many political enemies
because he had shifted his party affiliation no less than five times. Cush-
ing started out as a Whig, bolted to John Tyler's Whig faction, aban-
doned Whiggery for the Democrats,. aligned himself with Andrew
Johnson's version of the Democratic Party, and finally became a Repub-
lican when it was far too late to do him any political good.'1 Grant
quickly withdrew the nomination.
In 1930, Herbert Hoover nominated John Parker, a United States
Court of Appeals Judge, who was rejected 41 to 39 by the Senate, which
was influenced by a coalition of organized labor and the NAACP. Or-
ganized labor objected to Parker because he had upheld yellow dog con-
tracts. Parker's reasonable defense to this was that he was bound by
Supreme Court precedent to do so. The NAACP castigated him for
some racist sentiments uttered when he had been a gubernatorial candi-
date in North Carolina in 1920. Ironically, Parker (who remained on the
Fourth Circuit after his rejection) was one of the earliest southern judi-
cial advocates of desegregation.12
Lyndon Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas for the Chief Justice-
ship was opposed on purely political grounds. When Fortas appeared
before the Senate Judiciary Committee for his confirmation hearings, a
younger and more vigorous Senator Thurmond shouted at him, "Mal-
lory! Mallory! I want that name to ring in your ears!"' 3 Fortas had not
even been on the Court when it handed down its 1957 decision in Mal-
lory v. United States,'4 which required federal prosecutors to arraign sus-
pects promptly in order to reduce the possibility of coerced confessions,
but to Senator Thurmond, Fortas must have epitomized the Warren
Court and that was good enough.
Robert Bork's 1987 rejection was due to the perception that he was
hostile to the right of privacy, that his constitutional interpretive philoso-
phy of originalism was either unworkable or likely to produce unpalat-
able results, and that many of his prior positions on constitutional law
were sufficiently "out of the mainstream" of American constitutional law
to make his confirmation politically unwise. Bork did not help his cause
by turning his confirmation hearings into a national seminar on constitu-
tional law, with himself in the role of the professor and the Senators as
slightly doltish students, albeit with the important difference that the stu-
11. Id. at 129.
12. See, e.g., Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
13. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 44.
14. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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dents wielded the grading power and ended up giving the professor a
failing grade.
C. Doubts about the Nominee's Ability or Integrity
When Salmon Chase died in 1873, President Grant proposed
George Williams as his replacement. Williams was a former Senator and
territorial governor of Oregon, and was serving as Attorney General with
such indifference that he had been known to completely forget scheduled
cabinet meetings.15 Some said that he lacked legal talent, a charge sup-
ported by the contention that he had botched a number of important
cases both in private practice and as Attorney General.16 Moreover, he
had used Justice Department funds to pay his household expenses, which
included maintenance of the most ostentatious carriage to be seen in the
capital. 17 Stung by the criticism, Williams asked Grant to withdraw his
name from consideration.
Perhaps the nadir in ability was reached with G. Harrold Carswell.
When Abe Fortas resigned in 1969 following the revelation of a number
of ethical improprieties, Richard Nixon nominated Clement Hayn-
sworth, a sitting federal appellate judge generally regarded as competent
if unspectacular. However, at Haynsworth's confirmation hearings it de-
veloped that he had displayed "patent insensitivity to... financial and
conflict-of-interest improprieties."' 8 He was rejected by a vote of 55 to
45. The famous and volcanic Nixonian anger erupted, and he vowed to
shove a nominee down the Senatorial throat. Enter Harrold Carswell, a
little known Florida judge with six months of experience on the United
States Court of Appeals. It turned out that Carswell was rather an ugly
racist: In 1948 he had loudly declared his "firm, vigorous belief in...
White Supremacy"' 9 and had acted on those beliefs while he was a Flor-
ida United States Attorney by circumventing desegregation orders.
Moreover, if Haynsworth was slightly above average in terms of ju-
dicial ability, Carswell was barely above failure. Even that did not deter
his proponents. Senator Roman Hruska memorialized himself by the
statement: "Even if he is mediocre there are a lot of mediocre judges and
people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't
they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises, Cardozos, and
Frankfurters, and stuff like that there."20 Senator Russell Long of Loui-
15. WILLIAM S. McFEELY, GRANT: A BIOGRAPHY 389 (1981).
16. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 46.
17. McFEELY, supra note 15, at 390.
18. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 15.
19. Id. at 16 (quoting RICHARD HARRIS, DECISION 15-16 (1971)).
20. 116 CONG. REc. 7498 (1970).
7
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siana added that he had "had enough of these upside down, corkscrew
thinkers... who are capable of the kind of thinking that winds up get-
ting us a 100 percent increase in crime in this country."" l Clearly, Judge
Carswell was no corkscrew thinker; the problem was that he was not
much of a thinker of any kind. Yale's Dean Louis Pollak testified, in
masterful understatement, that Carswell possessed "more slender creden-
tials than any Supreme Court nominee put forth in this century."' 2 I
should note, in fairness to now-Judge Pollak, that this opinion was ven-
tured in 1970; there are still nine years to go. At any rate, Carswell was
rejected 51 to 45. As if to confirm the senatorial judgment, Carswell
resigned from the appellate bench, ran unsuccessfully for the United
States Senate, briefly became a bankruptcy judge, then had some embar-
rassing encounters with the criminal law, and mercifully sank from pub-
lic view.
II. Controversial Successes
When John Marshall died in 1835, Andrew Jackson appointed
Roger Taney to be his successor. This nomination was calculated to in-
flame the Senate: While acting as Treasury Secretary, Taney had been
Jackson's point man in the destruction of the Second Bank of the United
States by withdrawing all government deposits from the Bank of the
United States.23 The Senate reacted in an unprecedented manner by
adopting resolutions censuring both President Jackson and Taney.24
Moreover, Taney's service as Treasury Secretary had been as a recess
appointee; when Jackson belatedly forwarded his name to the Senate for
confirmation to the post the Senate rejected Taney the next day by a vote
of 28 to 18.25 Undeterred, Jackson nominated him seven months later, in
January 1835, for the seat vacated by the utterly mediocre Gabriel Du-
vall.26 The outraged Senate responded by waiting until the last day of its
session to vote to postpone consideration of the matter and, to rub salt
into Jackson's wounded hide, then voted to eliminate the vacancy
altogether.
Nevertheless, upon Marshall's death in July 1835, Jackson tried to
appoint Taney again. This time, Jackson plotted carefully. He coupled
21. Id. at 7487.
22. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 17 (quoting HARRis, supra note 19, at 16).
23. REMINi, supra note 2, at 105-06.
24. Id. at 148-52.
25. Id. at 170-72.
26. Duvall served 25 years on the Court and managed to utter only two words on consti-
tutional law: "I dissent." See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466, 468, 470-71 n.33 (1983).
rvol. 19:1
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Taney's nomination for Marshall's seat with Virginian Philip Barbour's
for Duvall's seat, thus defusing any opposition on grounds of geography.
He waited until December 1835 to submit the nominations, for in the
intervening months the combination of Democratic electoral victories,
resignations, and the admission of Michigan to the Union had produced
a Senate considerably more loyal to Jacksonian Democracy. The Senate
debated the matter in bitter terms for three months, resisted several Whig
attempts to adjourn in order to avoid the vote, but finally voted 29 to 15
to confirm Taney.27
In 1858, James Buchanan nominated his political crony Nathan
Clifford to succeed the eminent and respected Benjamin Curtis, one of
the Dred Scott dissenters, who, in effect, had resigned in protest over the
Dred Scott decision. Clifford combined defense of slavery with endorse-
ment of Jacksonian egalitarianism. This uneasy mixture ignited when
introduced into a Senate containing abolitionists and their allies. Five
weeks of acrimonious debate, the inexplicable absence at the vote of abo-
litionists Charles Sumner and Simon Cameron, and a last minute change
of heart by SenatorAllen of Rhode Island produced a cliffhanger victory
for Clifford, 26 to 23.28
Two months before the end of his presidential tenure, Rutherford
Hayes nominated his college classmate, Stanley Matthews, for the Court.
Matthews had been Hayes' lawyer before the Electoral Commission and
the House of Representatives in the disputed election of 1876. Since then
he had become a Republican Senator from Ohio and chief counsel to the
notorious robber baron, Jay Gould. Matthews' association with Gould
caused the Senate to convulse with anger and the Judiciary Committee
refused to act at all on the nomination. Amazingly, when the gullible
and weak James Garfield succeeded Hayes, he promptly renominated
Matthews, probably because he was unable to resist the powerful influ-
ences exerted by Jay Gould. Two months of angry debate and the deep
purse of Gould produced the narrowest confirmation ever: 24 to 23. The
New York Times called it "a sad and inexcusable error,"'29 but it must
have been bitter fruit for Gould, for Mathews often joined the first Jus-
27. REMINI, supra note 2, at 266-67, 315-16.
28. It should be noted that Professor David Currie, who has undertaken a truly exhaust-
ing and painstaking examination of the constitutional work of the Court, rates Nathan Clifford
on a par with Gabriel Duvall for the coveted title of Most Insignificant Justice. Clifford's
claim to the title is based on an impressively high score in Currie's category of "Inanities Per
Page." In Currie's view, Clifford "wrote with less persuasive effect... than anyone else who
ever sat on the Supreme Court bench." Currie, supra note 26, at 473-74.
29. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 136 (citing N.Y. TIMES March 13, 1881, at 1).
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tice Harlan in opinions upholding the power of government to regulate
economic activities.
Grover Cleveland's first opportunity to fill a Court vacancy in 1887
gave the Democrats their first chance since Buchanan's presidency to se-
lect a Justice. Cleveland picked Mississippi's Lucius Quintus Cincinna-
tus Lamar. Lamar had written Mississippi's Ordinance of Secession,
served as a member of the Confederate Congress, as Confederate Ambas-
sador to Russia, and as a Colonel in the Confederate Army. A gen-
tleman and scholar in the old Southern tradition, he had been a Professor
at the University of Mississippi, and had served as a United States Sena-
tor as well as Cleveland's Secretary of the Interior. But he was a South-
erner - the first to be appointed to the Court since 1853 - and an ex-
secessionist. Northern Republicans savaged him on that account, but he
prevailed by four votes, 32 to 28. The margin of victory was provided by
"one Independent and two Western Republican Senators, including Le-
land Stanford of California, who feared a vote against Lamar would be
interpreted as a ban against all Confederate veterans." '30
When Wilson proposed Louis Brandeis in 1916, opposition centered
on Brandeis' supposed radical politics but was rooted also in a scarcely
concealed anti-Semitism. From January to June 1916, ugly charges and
smears were bandied about. Not enough of them stuck, for Brandeis was
approved by the Judiciary Committee on a 10 to 8 vote and was subse-
quently confirmed by a vote of 47 to 22.
In 1937, shortly after his overwhelming re-election to a second term,
Franklin Roosevelt proposed his court-packing plan. During the pen-
dency of the proposal, Willis Van Devanter, the oldest of the "Four
Horsemen," resigned. The general expectation, confirmed by Roosevelt's
political confidant, Jim Farley, was that FDR would select Joseph
Robinson, an Arkansas Senator who led the fight for the Court-packing
bill as the Democratic Senate Majority Leader.31 Anticipating
Roosevelt's action, the Senate even endorsed the expected nomination of
Robinson. Before he was nominated, Robinson suffered a fatal heart at-
tack, and FDR selected another Southern Democratic Senator, Hugo
Black of Alabama.
Black's chief qualification seemed to be party loyalty. His legal ex-
perience was limited to private practice in rural Alabama, as a county
solicitor, and as a police court judge and prosecutor in Birmingham.
Black was attacked as utterly unqualified, as a blindly partisan radical
and, once it developed that he had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan a
30. Id. at 140.
31. JAMES FARLEY, JIM FARLEY'S STORY 86 (1948).
[Vol. 19:1
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dozen years earlier, as a racist masquerading as a phony liberal. The
Chicago Tribune declared that Roosevelt had selected "'the worst he
could find.' ,32 The Senate was less disturbed; the Judiciary Committee
approved Black's nomination by a vote of 13 to 4 and the entire Senate
confirmed him, five days after the nomination was made, by a vote of 63
to 16.
After the confirmation, a Pittsburgh reporter disclosed that Black
held a lifetime membership in the Klan. Jokes quickly spread to the ef-
fect that Black need not purchase judicial robes; he only had to dye black
the color of the ones he already owned. 3 Black refuted the charges in a
radio statement in which he admitted his former Klan membership and
the fact that the Klan had sought to bestow life membership upon him.
He denied that he had anything to do with the Klan and asked that he be
judged on his public record. History has done so and has utterly acquit-
ted him.
I. Senatorial Picks
There are at least two occasions in which the Senate has done more
than block a President's choice, and effectively selected the nominee.
During Grant's Presidency, while his nomination of Ebenezer Rockwood
Hoar was pending, another vacancy developed. A large majority of Con-
gress demanded that Grant choose the impetuous and ardently radical
Edwin Stanton, Lincoln's Secretary of War. Grant assented after strik-
ing a bargain with Senate leaders: The quid pro quo for Stanton's confir-
mation must be Hoar's confirmation. Stanton was confirmed the day
after his nomination was made, by a vote of 46 to 11. Four days later he
died of a stroke and the Senate, regarding a dead Justice of its choosing
to be an insufficient half of the bargain, rejected Hoar.
In January 1932, the ninety-one year old Oliver Wendell Holmes
retired. President Hoover announced that he intended to replace him
with a "non-controversial western Republican."'34 This announcement
triggered a public clamor for Benjamin Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals. The Chairman of the. Judiciary Commit-
tee, Senator Norris of Nebraska, made it quite plain that the Judiciary
Committee expected Hoover to submit a judicial statesman. The entire
faculty of the University of Chicago Law School, and the Deans of the
law schools of Columbia, Yale, and Harvard joined in a petition urging
Cardozo's appointment. Despite this, Hoover stood adamant, until Sen-
32. JOHN P. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND His OPINIONS 105 (1949).
33. GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 43 (1977).
34. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 201.
HeinOnline  -- 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 11 1991-1992
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
ator Borah of Idaho, whose support Hoover needed for other reasons,
demanded Cardozo's appointment. Hoover summoned Borah to the
White House and handed him a list in which Hoover had itemized his
preferences in descending rank order. Cardozo was at the bottom.
Borah studied the list and handed it back to Hoover with the comment:
"Your list is all right, but you handed it to me upside down."35 Hoover
complied and the nation was richer for it. In his later years, Hoover
declared that appointing Cardozo was "the proudest act of his career."36
IV. Letting the Justices Choose
The Justices themselves have influenced appointments to the Court
with surprising frequency. In 1853, Justices Catron and Curtis presented
themselves to President Pierce with a request, signed by all of the sitting
Justices, that he appoint the accomplished and nationally known Ala-
bama lawyer, John Campbell, to the Court. Pierce did so.
Following the Civil War the Justices intervened frequently to sug-
gest nominees. Justice Grier lobbied successfully for Grant's appoint-
ment of William Strong; Justice Swayne persuaded Grant to appoint
Joseph Bradley; Chief Justice Waite obtained Hayes' appointment of
William Woods; Justice Samuel Miller persuaded Benjamin Harrison to
appoint David Brewer; and Justice Brown convinced Benjamin Harrison
to put Howell Jackson on the Court.
William Howard Taft was the champion manipulator. In 1910, he
elevated Edward White from Associate Justice to Chief Justice, amid
open regrets that propriety prevented him from appointing himself.
There was public speculation that White had secured the promotion by a
promise to resign during the tenure of some future Republican President
in order to accommodate Taft. In a manner of speaking, White upheld
his end of the bargain by dying in the early days of the Harding Presi-
dency, whereupon Taft asserted his divine right to the job. Harding, who
admitted to Columbia University's president that "I am not fit for this
office and should never have been here,"37 willingly capitulated to Taft.
Harding made three more appointments to the Court - George Suther-
land, Edward Sanford and Pierce Butler - but in each case Taft dictated
the choice. When Harding displayed a surprising streak of independence
35. Id. at 202-03.
36. Id. at 197. In this assessment Hoover was joined by his political opponents. Washing-
ton's Democratic Senator Clarence Dill declared the Cardozo appointment to be Hoover's
"finest act of his career as President." N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1932, at 13. The Senate signalled
its concurrence by confirming Cardozo unanimously, without discussion or roll call vote.
37. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD
ORDER, 1919-1933, at 51 (1957).
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and considered appointing Benjamin Cardozo, Taft skewered the idea by
informing Harding that Cardozo was certain to side with that "danger-
ous twosome" Brandeis and Holmes, and that it was necessary to spurn
Cardozo in order to "prevent the Bolsheviks from getting control" of the
Court.38
Chief Justice Hughes persuaded Franklin Roosevelt to appoint
Harlan Stone his successor as Chief Justice. Truman asked for the advice
of the then-retired Hughes when it came time to replace Stone, but didn't
follow it when he appointed his crony, Fred Vinson, as Chief Justice.
Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, and Truman all asked Stone for advice on
nominations. Louis Brandeis asked Roosevelt to select William 0.
Douglas as his successor and Roosevelt did so. Chief Justice Earl War-
ren and Felix Frankfurter were both influential in John Kennedy's deci-
sion to appoint Arthur Goldberg as Frankfurter's replacement. Warren
was also involved in Lyndon Johnson's decision to nominate Abe Fortas
as Warren's successor. Warren Burger gave regular advice to Presidents
Nixon and Reagan on the subject of nominations.
V. Conclusion
Some general conclusions may be made. The nomination and con-
firmation process is an iterative dialogue between the President, the Sen-
ate, and often the Court. Political and personal realities play a significant
role in determining the relative strengths of the voices of the participants
in the dialogue. There is nothing historically anachronistic in Senate re-
jection of Presidential appointees; indeed, the Senate has sometimes dic-
tated the nominee. On those occasions, the Senate has sometimes
demanded that the President act in a fashion transcendent of partisan
politics, as in the case of Benjamin Cardozo, but it has also demanded
that the President act incraven service of partisanship, as in the case of
Edwin Stanton.
The process would be improved if both the President and the Senate
were to recognize that they must take each other seriously. When the
President or the Senate has sought to ignore, spite, humiliate, or exploit
the other, acrimony and poor appointments have resulted. Andrew Jack-
son, for example, believed that the best way to deal with senatorial rejec-
tion of a Presidential nominee was either to leave the post vacant or to
offer another nominee even less palatable than the first.39 Jackson's ap-
pointments to the Court were hardly stellar. Nixon's attempt to emulate
38. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 184.
39. REMINI, supra note 2, at 267.
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Jackson's strategy produced Harrold Carswell. Mutual respect and a de-
cent regard for governmental institutions would decrease the likelihood
that pique will produce judicial disasters.
It would also be helpful to realize that some of the poorer appoint-
ments have been the product of excessive partisan zeal. For example,
Taft's manipulation of the appointment process was for frankly partisan
purposes. The result was that, with the exception of Charles Evans
Hughes, the Justices selected by Taft, either overtly as President or co-
vertly as Chief Justice, were lacking in distinction. One way to dampen
that zeal might be to require a two-thirds vote by the Senate for
confirmation.
A requirement of a two-thirds supermajority for confirmation to the
Supreme Court could be accomplished by constitutional amendment,
though one could plausibly argue that Congress has the power to do so
by ordinary legislation. The Constitution provides that the President
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint. . . Judges of the [S]upreme Court."' The immediately
preceding clause clearly states that the President "shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."41 Given the express two
thirds requirement imposed with respect to treaty ratification, it is a rea-
sonable inference that judicial confirmations were intended to be by a
bare majority. Moreover, in the course of their deliberations, the dele-
gates to the 1787 Convention amended the treaty ratification clause to
include the two-thirds supermajority requirement. The context of the
debate suggests strongly that the Framers understood the naked phrase,
"advice and consent," to mean a simple majority.42 However, since the
judicial confirmation clause does not expressly declare that the consent
required is by a simple majority, it is at least arguable that the majority
necessary for exercise of the consent power bestowed on the Senate may
be altered from time to time by ordinary legislation. In any event, were
Congress to enact legislation creating a two-thirds consent requirement,
it is possible that the validity of that action would be a nonjusticiable
political question.43
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 540-41 (Max Far-
rand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1937).
43. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (finding the power of the President
unilaterally to abrogate a treaty to be nonjusticiable); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)
(efficacy of the purported state ratification of a constitutional amendment is a nonjusticiable
political question).
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However accomplished, such a change would require the President
to select a nominee with broad public support. In most cases, it would
require the President to pick someone with a healthy modicum of biparti-
san support. It is true that a two-thirds rule would have little impact
when the President and an overwhelming proportion of the Senate are of
the same party. Such moments have been relatively rare in our history
and, in any case, the idea behind this proposal is not to achieve perfection
but to dampen excess.
A two-thirds rule would inevitably increase the impact of special
interest groups because they would be able to block any nomination if
they could garner the support of one third of the Senate's members plus
one. This may appear to be a defect, but if so, it is one that can be readily
overcome. A premium would be placed on nominating a person whose
accomplishments, constitutional philosophy, and professional stature is
so beyond cavil that even groups politically opposed to the nominee
would fail to arouse senatorial opposition. Not every Justice will be Ben-
jamin Cardozo, but the possibility of special interest checks will increase
the odds that a larger proportion of nominees will look more like Car-
dozo than Thomas.
Historically, the existence of a two-thirds rule would only have re-
versed eight confirmations:
PRESIDENT AND
NOMINEE VOTE YEAR
Clarence Thomas 52:48 Bush, 1991
William Rehnquist (for CJ) 65:33 Reagan, 1986
Mahlon Pitney 50:26 Taft, 1912
Lucius Lamar 33:28 Cleveland, 1888
Stanley Matthews 24:23 Garfield, 1881
Nathan Clifford 26:23 Buchanan, 1858
John Catron 28:15 Jackson, 1837
Roger Taney (for CJ) 29:15 Jackson, 1836
The loss of the services of this group would have been no great
tragedy for the nation. Of these, it should be noted that Nathan Clifford
is one of Professor David Currie's finalists for "Most Insignificant
Justice," and that Lucius Lamar and John Catron each received
honorable mention from Currie. 4  I might add Mahlon Pitney to
Currie's list. I take no position on sitting Justices.
Of course, a two-thirds vote would have altered the dynamics of
confirmation, so it is only fair to disclose the close calls, confirmations
which would have barely survived by a two-thirds requirement:
44. See, Currie, supra note 27.
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PRESIDENT AND
NOMINEE VOTE YEAR
Charles Evans Hughes (for CJ) 52:26 Hoover, 1930
Louis Brandeis 47:22 Wilson, 1916
Melville Fuller (for CJ) 41:20 Cleveland, 1888
The loss of these Justices, especially Brandeis and Hughes, would
have been a much larger loss to our nation. It may be that a two-thirds
rule would extinguish some dim flames but at the cost of snuffing out
some bright candles. On this point, all is speculation. The thrust of this
suggestion is not to claim that it will produce better justices in every
instance of its application, but to suggest that the addition of another
structural check might lessen the institutional costs that the current
process seems to impose.
History tells us that politics are at the heart of the confirmation
process. There is no way to drain the politics from this swamp. Some
salutary changes are voluntary, and necessarily policed voluntarily. But
it might also be an opportune moment to consider altering the structure
of the process in a way that, over time, would likely be politically neutral
in its impact.
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